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EMPLOYMENT RIGHTS: AGENCY WORKERS: James v Greenwich Council and subsequent cases
Agency workers in the UK face a number of difficulties due to their vulnerable position in the  job
market. They have no security of tenure, are generally paid less than   permanent   workers,  terms
and conditions are often less favourable and access to statutory benefits  is  mainly  limited  to  the
national minimum wage, statutory sick  pay  and  maternity/  paternity  pay  and  state  pension.[1]
Employees, on the other hand, who work under a contract  of  service,  or  employment,   are  in  a
much more secure position with their rights relating to dismissal  and  redundancy  being  possibly
the most important.
To counter the effects of the resulting lack of protection for certain groups  of  workers,  including
agency workers, courts and tribunals have in the past been only too ready  to  imply  a  contract  of
employment where this was not the intention of the parties. This was  often  for  reasons  of  social
policy, such as where the case involved a  claim  for   compensation  for  breach  of  duty  of  care;
examples appear in Walker v Crystal Palace [1910][2] and Ferguson v John  Dawson  [1976][3].
In such cases, to deny the existence of a contract would have been  to  prevent  the  claimant  from
having the capacity to claim compensation for their injuries. Yet, to  imply  a  contract  where  this
was not the intention of the parties could be considered  a  step  too  far,  despite  the  view  of  the
Court of Appeal in Dacas v Brook  St  Bureau  (UK)  Ltd  [4].  In  this  case  it  was  said  that  the
absence of an express contract between an agency worker and the end-user does not  preclude  the
implication  of  a  contract  of  service  between  them.[5]  However,  subsequent  cases,  discussed
below, have firmly reversed the notion  that  implication  of  a  contract  between  the  worker  and
either the end-user or the  agency  is  the  appropriate  means  of  giving  them  greater  rights,  and
suggest that greater protection for agency workers should  be  a  concern  for  the  legislator  rather
than the courts.
The issue has been considered recently in a number of cases that have attempted  to  clarify  when,
and if, it is appropriate to imply a contract  of  employment,  and  with  whom.  The  line  of  cases
began at the end of 2006 with  James  v  Greenwich  Council[6],  followed  shortly  afterwards  by
Craigie v London  Borough  Council  of  Haringey  [2007][7].  Both  cases  were  decided  by  the
Employment Appeal Tribunal, and on each occasion the EAT was  reluctant  to  find  that  a  long-
standing worker was an employee of the agency. The EAT published  two  further  judgements  in
March of this year; these were Astbury v Gist [2007][8]   and    Heatherwood  and  Wexham  Park
Hospitals NHS Trust v Kulubowila[2007].[9]  In May, the decision in the last in the line of  cases,
Kalwak v Welsh Country Foods Ltd [2007][10] was handed down by the EAT.
In the first of these  cases,  the  appellant,  Mrs  James,  was  supplied  by  an  agency,  BS  Project
Services Ltd, to carry out work for Greenwich Council, the end-user. She had  been  dismissed  by
the Council following a prolonged sickness absence, during which a replacement worker had been
supplied by the agency. In order to claim unfair dismissal, she first had to show that  there  existed
between her and the Council a contract of employment, as defined under s.230 of the Employment
Rights Act 1996. Her contention was that, despite having no  express  contract  with  the  Council,
there was an implied contract. Her reasoning was that  she  had  worked  for  the  Council  for  five
years  and  had  been  treated  in  all  respects  like  those  employees  with   permanent   contracts.
Following the guidance given by the Court of Appeal in Dacas v Brook St  Bureau[11],  in  which
mutuality of obligation was held to be a necessary factor in a contract of employment, the tribunal
had concluded that this essential element was missing, and therefore declined to imply  a  contract
between Mrs James and the Council. She appealed on the basis that the tribunal had  erred  in  law
and reached a perverse decision. Although she lost her appeal,  the  EAT  (Elias  P  presiding)  did
take the opportunity to give some useful guidelines on implying contracts  of  employment  where
an agency worker is involved.
Although s.230(1) of the Employment Rights  Act  1996[12]  is  a  particularly  unhelpful  section,
giving as it does a somewhat circular definition of what is mean by an employee, the  courts  have,
over a number of years, devised certain tests and identified particular criteria  which  have  proved
invaluable in deciding whether or not a contract of employment (a contract of service)  exists,  and
the worker is therefore an employee, or whether it is merely an agreement to provide  a  service  (a
contract for services i.e. self-employment).
In Ready Mixed Concrete v Minister of Pensions 1968[13]  Mackenna  J  identified  the  following
three conditions necessary for the existence of a contract of service:
i. The servant agrees that, in  consideration  of  a  wage  or  other  remuneration,  he  will
provide his own work and skill in the performance of some service for his master;
ii. He agrees expressly or impliedly that in  the  performance  of  that  service  he  will  be
subject to the other’s control in a sufficient degree to make that other master;
iii. The provisions of the contract are consistent with its being a contract of service.
This  passage  has  since  been  followed  in  a  number  of  cases.[14]  In  Carmichael  v  National
Power, the Lord Chancellor, Lord Irvine of Lairg noted that there was “an absence  of  irreducible
minimum of mutual obligation necessary to create a contract of service”.[15]
Although there has been some dispute as  to  what  these  mutual  obligations  consist  of,  Elias  P
states in James v Greenwich Council that “the nature of the duty must involve some  obligation  to
work”.[16] He goes on to summarise:
“In short, some mutual irreducible minimal obligation is necessary to create a contract; the  nature
of those mutual obligations must be such as to give rise to a contract in the employment field:  and
the issue of control determines whether that contract is a contract or employment or not.”[17]
In agency cases, there is a triangular arrangement whereby the agency and worker have a  contract
under which he or she agrees to provide services to the end-user, and the agency and the  end-user
have  a  contract  whereby  the  agency  agrees  to  provide   that   worker.   There   is   usually   no
express contract between the worker and the end-user. There is, however, a  relationship  between
them, and no doubt a significant  element  of  control  being  exercised  by  the  end-user  over  the
worker. The question  that  has  perplexed  the  courts  is  “whether  that  work  is  being  provided
pursuant to a contractual obligation (emphasis added) between the end-user and the worker”.[18]
In Dacas, Mummery LJ appeared to recognise the absurdity of the no-man’s land in which agency
workers find themselves by suggesting the possibility that  there  could  be  a  contract  between  a
worker and the end-user, and that a tribunal should always consider this possibility  by  looking  at
the evidence “which includes, but is not  confined  to,  the  contractual  documents.”[19]  In  other
words, the tribunal should not confine themselves to the  written  documents  but  should  consider
whether the evidence as a whole would give rise to the implication of  a  contract  of  employment
arising from a “necessary inference”.
Sedley LJ agreed with this, pointing  out  that  “the  conclusion  that  Mrs  Dacas  is  employed  by
nobody is simply not credible”. To deny the existence of  an  employer  would  be  to  remove  the
element of vicarious liability, and thus deny potential victims of torts committed by  the  worker  a
remedy from an insured party. However, it was later recognised by the Court of  Appeal  in  Cable
and Wireless plc v Muscat [20] that vicarious liability can arise even if the  agency  worker  is  not
an employee, thus  negating  the  necessity  of  finding  a  worker  to  be  an  employee  simply  on
grounds of policy.
Munby J had disagreed, considering that the crucial point was that in  Dacas  the  right  to  control
and the duty to remunerate were in different hands.  However,  this  analysis  was  rejected  in  the
Muscat case, and the majority approach in Dacas was confirmed. The Court of Appeal upheld  the
decision  of  the  Employment  Tribunal  that  Muscat  had  an  implied  contract  with  Cable   and
Wireless, despite being paid by  an  agency,  Abraxas.  The  court  emphasised  the  importance  of
looking at the arrangements  in  their  entirety:  the  history  of  the  relationship  began  as  one  of
employment, but Muscat had been required  by  his  employer  to  supply  his  services  through  a
limited company, thus leaving him no choice in  the  manner  of  the  relationship.  Thus  the  facts
differ significantly from Dacas, resulting in a different finding, but the approach of the  court  was
exactly the same – “to consider the total situation of  the  parties.”[21]   Muscat  owed  a  personal
obligation to provide his labour and the employers had an obligation to accept it.
The crucial point being emphasised in Muscat, and by Mummery LJ in Dacas was that, in order to
imply a contract  to  give  business  reality  it  must  be  necessary  to  imply  it.  This  follows  the
judgement of  Bingham  LJ  (as  he  then  was)  in  The  Aramis  1989,  concerning  a  commercial
contract.[22] Where the agency agreements were intended, not  to  reflect  the  true  nature  of  the
relationship, but  rather  to  obscure  the  reality,  the  courts  should  be  prepared  to  find  that  an
employment  contract  exists.  This  view  was  expressed  by  Gibson  LJ  in  Express   and   Echo
Publications v Tanton 1999.[23]
Mrs James in the present case accepted that the original agreement was intended by  both  her  and
the agency to be a true contract for services, and was not intended to be a sham. Her argument was
that after a period of time the arrangement as set out in the documentation was varied,  and  that  a
contract of employment could be implied through custom and practice  in  order  to  give  business
efficacy  to  the  relationship.  The  Council  argued,  inter  alia,  that  there  was  no  mutuality  of
obligation, the “irreducible minimum” referred to by Lord Irvine in Carmichael v National Power
plc.
The EAT agreed with the Council’s view and dismissed the appeal. The fact that Mrs James had  a
desire to create a contract of employment did not support her argument for implication of such  an
agreement, the Council never having expressly or impliedly suggested that this  was  its  desire  or
intention.
The conclusions and observations of the EAT can be summarised as follows:
1. Following Dacas, circumstances may exist which could lead to the inference of an implied
contract in some cases.
2. The focus should be on mutuality of obligations and  whether  it  was  necessary  to  imply
such a contract.
3. The mere passage of time is insufficient to give rise to an implied contract.
4. In agency cases, the focus should be on whether the way the contract is  in  fact  performed
as if it was merely an arrangement between an agency and a worker, or whether in fact it is
only consistent with it being an implied contract between the worker and the end user.
5. That the money paid by the end-user to the  agency  is  not  a  simple  matter  of  indirectly
paying the wages of the  worker,  but  includes  elements  of  profit  and  expenses  for  the
agency. It is a payment for services supplied by the agency  and  cannot  be  considered  as
remuneration for the worker.
6. Further, the fact that the end-user cannot  insist  on  the  provision  of  a  particular  worker
from the agency is further evidence of there being no contract of employment.
7. That an implied contract between worker and end-user will be rare, but may occur:
i. when there was either a pre-existing employer/employee  relationship,  such  as
in Muscat, where the only change is in who pays the wages, or;
ii. when, subsequent to the commencement  of  the  worker/end-user  relationship,
some words or conduct between the parties are suggestive of a relationship  that
is consistent with  the  implication  of  a  contract;  the  worker  should  then  no
longer  be  working  according  to  the  agency  arrangement  but  under  one  of
mutual obligation with the end-user.[24]
8. The EAT recognised the vulnerability of agency workers, who are far  less  well  protected
than employees, but also  warned  that  it  was  for  the  legislature  to  undertake  a  careful
analysis of the benefits and disbenefits of the system, saying that  the  common  law  could
“only tinker with the problem on the margins.”[25]
Hot on the heels of this judgement came a further case which took  a  similar  view.  In  Craigie  v
London Borough of Haringey [26], Bean J considered the appeal of Mr Craigie  who  had  worked
at the Local authority for over a year; when his services were dispensed with, he  claimed  that  he
was an employee and therefore qualified to claim that he had been unfairly dismissed.
The contract between Craigie and the agency, Aptus Personnel Support Staff Ltd, provided that he
was not an employee of the agency and the agency did not exercise any  day  to  day  control  over
Craigie.  Thus,  the  EAT  had  to  consider   whether   the   Claimant   was   employed   under   an
implied contract of service with Haringey Council after a finding by the Employment tribunal that
there was insufficient mutuality of obligation between the parties to support such a finding. 
The  EAT  considered  the  cases  of  Dacas,  Muscat  and  James.  Bean  J  reminded  us  that  the
observation that the council were probably employers of Mrs Dacas was  obiter  (since  the  action
was brought against the agency and not the council). The Court of Appeal in Muscat  clarified  the
position.  Although  it  was  submitted  to  the  court  that  Dacas  was  binding  authority   for   the
proposition that in circumstances such as these there should be a finding of an implied contract  of
employment between the worker and end user, the court disagreed.
Later in the judgement the court referred to the principle of  necessity,  contained  for  example  in
the judgement of Bingham LJ, as he then was, in The Aramis [27] that:
            “No contract should be implied on the facts of any given case unless it is necessary  to
do so, necessary that is to say in order to give business reality to a transaction and  to  create
enforceable obligations between parties who are dealing with one  another  in  circumstances
in which one would expect that business reality and those enforceable obligations to exist.”
The  court  then  cited  an  observation  in  paragraph  16  of  the  judgement  of  Mummery  LJ  in
Dacas that:
            “Depending on the evidence in the case a contract of service may be implied –  that  is
deduced  –  as  a  necessary  inference  from  the   conduct   of   the   parties   and   from   the
circumstances surrounding the parties and the work done.”
Bean J in Craigie observed:
“The court in Muscat took that, as I do, to be an express appreciation of the principle
referred to in The Aramis, that the inference must be a necessary one and not  merely
a possible or even a desirable one.”[28]
From a legalistic point of view, this conclusion is highly desirable and will be welcomed  by  both
agencies and employers, since it provides a high  degree  of  certainty.  Contracts  of  employment
will  not  arise  by  implication  unless  such  an  inference  is  a  necessary  one  to   make   in   the
circumstances of that particular case.
This would also appear to be the approach of the EAT in Astbury and Heatherwood, both  decided
by Judge Peter Clark. In Astbury, he took  the  view  that,  since  Parliament  could  have  included
protection for contract workers against unfair dismissal for  whistle-blowing,  but  did  not  do  so,
then it  was  not  for  the  courts  to  provide  such  protection.[29]  In  Heatherwood,  Judge  Clark
considered the question of whether the implication of a contract of  employment  was  “necessary”
under the Aramis test and decided that it was not.
However, from the point of view of the average agency worker, these decisions must have  been  a
great disappointment, particularly following the encouraging remarks made obiter in Dacas.
Such workers may nevertheless take some heart from  the  most  recent  case  of  Kalwak  v  Welsh
Country Foods Ltd [2007][30] in which the EAT heard an appeal from the Employment  Tribunal
following a finding that, in the particular circumstances of the case, an agency  supplying  workers
to  a  third  party  had  entered  into  contracts  of  employment  with   those   workers.   The   EAT
considered and rejected various grounds of appeal.
The appellant, Consistent Group Ltd, was an employment agency;  the  respondents  were,  firstly,
Mrs Kalwak and others, who were provided by the agency to the  second  respondent,  a  company
named Welsh Country Foods Ltd.
The workers had  claimed,  inter  alia,  that  they  had  been  dismissed  for  proposed  trade  union
membership   or   activities,   contrary   to   s.15   of   the   Trade   Union   and   Labour   Relations
(Consolidation) Act 1992. To be successful in such a claim they first had to show  that  they  were
employees as defined by s.230 of the Employment Rights Act 1996, and if so, whether  they  were
employees of the agency or of Welsh Country Foods. The tribunal had concluded  that  they  were
not employed by the latter, but that they did have a contract of employment  with  the  agency  due
to the “sufficient personal obligation” of the workers and the high degree of control exercised over
them by the agency. This was highlighted by the tribunal chairman in summarising the case:
             “…I  noted  the  frequency  with  which  the   first   respondents   in   the   documents
(Consistent) sought to emphasize the absence  of  rights  -  holiday  pay,  fringe  benefits,  the
right  to  complain  of  unfair  dismissal.  These  were  their  real  concern.  They  in  practice
retained a firm measure of effective  control  over  the  claimants’  working  lives.  They  told
them when and where they had to work, they might deny them days off, they provided  them
with transport and accommodation (taken away, as it proved, without notice). They ensured
further economy in the claimants’ employment by charging them for domestic  services  that
were not provided.”
In other words, the agency exploited a highly vulnerable, non-unionised  group  of  mainly  Polish
immigrants, and the decision is therefore right  and  fair;  but  it  should  be  remembered  that  the
circumstances were highly exceptional, and we  are  unlikely  to  see  a  sudden  plethora  of  cases
where agency workers are found to be employees.
The relative helplessness of this group  of  workers,  and  the  difficulties  faced  by  the  courts  in
coming to sensible, but fair, decisions highlights  the  necessity  for  legislation  in  this  area.  The
EAT in Craigie commented that the law regarding the status of long  term  agency  workers  is  far
from satisfactory and took the view that legislation was need to change it.
Such legislation has been put forward both in the UK and in Europe. However, the draft European
Temporary Workers Directive has no immediate prospect of  implementation  due  to  the  lack  of
support from some member states. At home, a Private Member’s Bill, the Temporary and  Agency
Workers (Prevention of Less favourable Treatment) Bill, was presented  by  Paul  Farrelly  MP  in
December 2006. It is a Bill to prohibit discrimination against temporary and agency  workers,  and
to make provision about the enforcement of rights for such workers.  The  second  reading  is  now
scheduled for 19th October 2007 but, without  government  support  is  unlikely  to  progress.  It  is
therefore submitted that, although some progress has been  made  by  the  courts  towards  a  fairer
deal for agency workers, it is unlikely that the legal position of agency  workers  will  be  changed
for the better for some considerable time.
JACKIE LANE
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